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This paper examines the role of Rules of Origin as a commercial policy instrument
which targets the input composition of imports. Using a three country, partial
equilibrium structure, we demonstrate conditions under which the imposition of a
binding Rule will be welfare improving for an importer facing either competitive export
suppliers or an export monopolist. We also show that employing Rules of Origin in this
way would be complementary to, rather than a substitute for, conventional optimal
tariffs.
First Draft September 1997
Comments Welcome2
Rules of Origin as Commercial Policy Instruments
I Introduction
The growth of international trade in goods that are not manufactured in a single
country has brought into prominence the rules for determining the “origin” of traded
products. Governments apply rules to determine the origin of products for two broad
reasons. First, to distinguish foreign from domestic products, when imports are not to
be granted national treatment. Second, to define the foreign origin of a product and the
conditions under which it will be considered as originating in a preference receiving
country (hence “preferential” rules). But rules of origin (ROOs) also have wider usage.
They play a role in the application of laws relating to marking, labeling, and
advertising; duty drawback provisions; government procurement; countervailing duty
and safeguard proceedings; and quantitative restrictions, including import prohibitions
and trade embargoes.
Where two or more countries have been involved in the manufacture of a product, the
general concept applied in formulating ROOs is that the product has origin where the
last “substantial transformation” took place
1. In practice there are three main methods
of determining whether substantial transformation has occurred:
(1) The Value Added Test: which requires that the last production process has
created a certain percentage of value added
2;
(2) Change in Tariff Heading Test: which confers origin if the activity in the
exporting country results in a product that is classified under a different heading of the
customs tariff classification than its intermediate inputs
3; and
                                                       
1 See Vermulst (1992) and Vermulst et.al. (1994) for a discussion of ROOs and their applications in
the major developed trading economies from a legal perspective. Falvey and Reed (1997) consider
their economic effects.
2 Application of this test requires an analysis of production costs and generally takes one or more of
three forms:
(a) a maximum allowable percentage of imported parts and materials;
(b) a minimum percentage of local value-added; or
(c) a minimum percentage of originating parts relative to the total value of parts.
There are many variations between countries in the way this test is applied, and the same facts can
lead to different origin determinations in different countries. Indeed there can be variations even
within a country, depending on the objective of the law it is intended to implement.3
(3) Technical Test: which sets out certain production activities that may
(positive test) or may not (negative test) confer originating status
4.
These tests can be applied singly or in combination, and administrative agencies may
depart from these methods when origin is to be determined for reasons other than
customs clearance (e.g. antidumping). The upshot is an international regime where
governments have considerable discretion in setting ROOs, particularly preferential
ROOs.
The interest of economists in ROOs is relatively recent, and has been prompted by the
falling importance of MFN tariffs, their replacement by other (discriminatory)
interventions, and the expansion of preferential trading arrangements. It has been
argued that the manner in which ROOs are defined and applied within these
arrangements will play a significant role in determining the protection that they confer
and the degree to which trade is distorted as a consequence
5. The economic analysis of
ROOs has been relatively limited, however, particularly analysis within formal models.
Partly this reflects a view that they have been relatively unimportant, partly it reflects
the complexity of the structures required for their analysis, particularly in a general
equilibrium context.
Much of the formal analysis has been concerned with content protection, investigating
the effects of host government requirements that foreign firms use a certain proportion
(measured by quantity or value) of host country inputs in their output in order for it to
be sold on the host market. The positive and normative aspects of these policies have
now been investigated in a variety of market structures
6. There is also a literature on
trade in vertically related markets, which explores the linkages between trade policies
in final and intermediate goods markets, again allowing for competitive and imperfectly
competitive market structures
7. Both types of analysis involve the same range of agents
as considered below - consumers, final goods producers and intermediate goods
                                                                                                                                                              
3 This test has the advantages of simplicity and predictability, although the tariff classification system
itself was not designed to distinguish “substantial transformations”.
4 This test is the best equipped to deal with any specific case, but is also the most easily abused.
5 See, for example, Krueger (1993), (1995) and Krishna and Krueger (1993).
6 See, for example, Grossman (1981), Dixit and Grossman (1982), Mussa (1984), Vousden (1987),
Krishna and Itoh (1986), Davidson et. al. (1987), and Richardson (1991) and (1993).
7 See, for example, Spencer and Jones (1989), (1991) and (1992).4
producers. The content protection literature is concerned with a policy that “protects”
domestic intermediate producers at the expense of domestic consumers and domestic
producers of the final good (if there are any). In vertically related markets the focus is
the interactions of trade in intermediates and final goods, particularly where one firm
or country is an exporter in both markets. In each case the importing country
potentially trades both types of goods, and its policy-making authorities are in a
position to impose the usual trade restrictions in both. The distinction here is that only
the final good is imported by the country whose government is making the policy
choice. Any trade in intermediates lies outside its jurisdiction.
Our objective in this paper is not further analysis of ROOs as supporting instruments
within a particular policy framework (e.g. a free trade area). Rather it is to explore
their potential role as an independent commercial policy instrument. The distinctive
feature of ROOs in this respect is that they target the input composition of imported
products. Our analysis addresses three main questions. What place, if any, is there for
such an instrument in a nation’s commercial policy portfolio? Under what
circumstances might an importing country use its ROO to raise domestic welfare? Is a
ROO simply a second best alternative to optimal tariff(s), or does it have an
independent and complementary role to play?
In adopting this approach we recognise that ROOs are not applied independently in
practice, and we are not intending for our results to support any change in this
direction. Our primary aim is to gain some understanding of how ROOs might operate
(both on their own and in conjunction with optimal tariffs) in a broader context than
has been examined to date. We do this through a relatively simple three country partial
equilibrium model, involving two exporters of a good (countries 1 and 2) and a single
importer (the home country). Production of this good requires an intermediate input
and value-added. For simplicity we assume that the good is not consumed in the
exporting countries and neither the final good nor the intermediate are produced by the
importer. The ROO is then modeled as imposing a constraint on the national origin of
the intermediate used with domestic value added in producing the final good. To show
that our results are not dependent on a particular market structure, two forms of5
competition in the world market are considered - competitive exporters and an export
monopoly. One should note that our results do depend on increasing unit costs in the
supply of all inputs, however. To the extent that this assumption is only appropriate for
the short run this is a short run analysis.
In outline the remainder of this paper is as follows. The next section sets up the model
and derives the optimal uniform and discriminatory tariffs. Section III then analyses the
welfare effects of imposing a (just) binding ROO, both with and without tariffs. The
final section presents our conclusions.
II Optimal Tariffs
II.1 Competitive Exporters
Consider the market for a homogeneous final commodity in which there are three
participants - the “home” country which is a pure importer of the product and whose
inverse demand function is r(Q), where r denotes the consumer price of the product
and Q is total consumption; and two pure exporters - countries 1 and 2. Units are
chosen so that production of each unit of this product requires one unit of value added
(q) and one unit of an intermediate input (x). This intermediate is also produced in the
two exporting countries (but not in the importing country) by competitive suppliers
with inverse (excess) supply functions pj(xj), where pj denotes the cost of the
intermediate from country j (j = 1,2). The inverse supply function of value added to
this industry in country j is denoted by vj(qj), where vj denotes the cost of value-added
in country j. Intermediates are tradable but value-addeds are not. We can therefore let
qj denote both the value added and the final output from country j. The market is thus
best viewed as composed of firms purchasing (nontraded) value added and (traded)
intermediates to produce a final good which is then sold to the home country.
The free trade equilibrium conditions in this competitive market can be written as:
v1(q1) = v2(q2) = v(Q) (1A)
p1(x1) = p2(x2) = p(Q) (1B)
x1+x2 = q1+q2 = Q (1C)6
r(Q) = p(Q) + v(Q) ” ac(Q) (1D)
Equations (1A) and (1B) require that the competitive producers of the final product
purchase inputs from the cheapest source, so that prices of inputs from the two sources
are equated; (1C) is a materials balance equation; and (1D) equates consumer price
with average cost (ac) which the price taking producers also assume to be their
marginal cost. Consumer surplus in the importing country is
CS(Q) =  r Q dQ r Q Q
Q
( ). ( ).
0 ￿ -





. ' = - (2)
where  ¢ ” r dr Q dQ ( ) < 0
8.
Since the importing country has monopsony power in this market, it can improve its
welfare by taxing imports. We first investigate the optimal uniform tariff, and then
consider the possibility of imposing discriminatory taxes. Let t denote a uniform
specific tariff. Aggregate home welfare from this market then becomes
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where  ¢ ‡ ¢ ‡ ¢ p v P j j 0 0 ; ;     ” ¢ + ¢ p p 1 2, and  ¢ ” V ¢ + ¢ v v 1 2 . After rewriting (1D) as
r(Q) = v(Q) + p(Q) + t = ac(Q) + t (5)
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Substituting in (3) allows us to solve for
                                                       








so that the (implicit) formula for the optimum uniform specific tariff (t
c) in this
instance is given by
t
c = Q.[r¢ - W
c] = ac¢.Q > 0 (6)
In order to interpret this expression, note that the total cost of producing Q in the
competitive market is
T(Q) = ac(Q).Q




ac Q ac Q Q
( )
( ) ( ). = + ¢
Thus the last term in this expression, which is the optimum uniform tariff formula,
denotes the difference between the marginal cost and the average cost of imports to
the importing country, implying that the optimal tax is set so as to equate consumer
price with marginal cost.
While a uniform tariff raises welfare, the fact that the final product is purchased from
two different sources with different supply elasticities suggests further gains if tariffs
are made discriminatory. Let tj denote the tariff levied on the final product from source
j. Importing country benefits from this market then become
W = CS(Q) +  t q j
j
j ￿
and the welfare effects of a change in the taxes are given (in total derivative form) as
dW Q r q dt t dq j
j
j j j = - + + ￿ . ' [ ] (7)
Now the price equals average cost condition (5) must be rewritten as two separate
equations
r(Q) = vj(qj) + p(Q) + tj j = 1,2 (8)





















where Aj =  ¢ - ¢ - ¢ r p v j ; a r p = ¢ - ¢and  ¢ = ¢ ¢ ¢ p p p P 1 2 .
Let A = A1.A2 - a
2  = - V¢.W
c > 0. Then (9) can be solved for9
a potential role for policies which are able to distinguish the products on the basis of
the origin of the intermediates embodied within them.
II.2 An Export Monopoly
We now reconsider the above for the case where the importing country faces an export
monopolist. This profit maximising monopolist is assumed to purchase intermediates
and value addeds from the two sources, although it would not matter if the monopolist
was directly involved in production of these inputs given that vj(qj) and pj(xj) are cost
functions, and in equilibrium equates the marginal costs of intermediates (mpj) and
value addeds (mvj) from the two sources, and then overall marginal cost with marginal
revenue (mr). The equilibrium conditions are now
mp1(x1) = mp2(x2) = mp(Q) (12A)
mv1(q1) = mv2(q2) = mv(Q) (12B)
x1+x2 = q1+q2 = Q (12C)
mr(Q) = mp(Q)+mv(Q) = mc(Q) (12D)
where mp p x p mv v q v mr r Q r j j j j j j j j = + ¢ > = + ¢ > = + ¢ > . ; . . 0 0 0    and  . We can use
these equations to solve for the optimal uniform and discriminatory taxes in an
identical fashion to the competitive case.
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and  MV mv mv MP mp mp ¢ = ¢ + ¢ ¢ = ¢ + ¢ 1 2 1 2 , .    For the uniform tax (t) rewrite (12D) as
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10 These expressions show what happens to inputs as the profit maximizing output increases as a
result of an expansion of demand.10
and mr r Q r ¢ = ¢ + ¢¢ < 2 0 . . The implicit formula for the optimal tariff (t
m) can then be
derived as
t
m = Q.[ ¢ - r
m W ] = Q.[ ¢ - r mr mc ¢ + ¢]
This formula can be interpreted in an analagous fashion to the competitive case. One
difference is that it is now possible for the optimal intervention to be an import subsidy.
A necessary condition for this is that the marginal revenue curve be “flatter” than the
demand curve (i.e. 0 > mr¢ > r¢)
11. Since this issue is tangential to our purpose, we
restrict attention to cases where t
m > 0. Again, the optimal uniform tariff is set so that
the domestic consumer price equals the marginal cost of imports to the importing
country.
To solve for the optimal differential taxes we must now write (13) as
mr(Q) = mvj(qj) + mpj(xj) +tj (14)
which allows us to proceed as before yielding:
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Exactly the same comments can be made concerning these results as for those in the
competitive market.
II.3 Linear Example: The results so far can be illustrated using linear functions. Let
r r r Q v v v q p p p x r v p r v
p p p p v v v p
p p p p
P
v
v v v v
V
r p
j j j j j j j j j j j
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 and note    > v  for a solution to exist. 0
D D
The outputs in the two cases are then shown in Table 1.
                                                       
11 See Brander and Spencer (1984).11
Table 1: Solutions for the Linear Case
Competitive Exporters Export Monopoly
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m ( )=Q t
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Note that the optimal discriminatory taxes in the competitive case adjust the value-
added mix to that which would be chosen by an export monopolist, for any given level
of output. But the level of output with these taxes and competitive suppliers is in fact
greater than that chosen by the monopolist in free trade.
III Rules of Origin
III.1 Competitive Exporters
To this point the exact origin of the intermediates used by each of the competitive final
goods suppliers has been of no consequence. Intermediates are supplied by competitive
firms in the two countries, and final goods producers are simply price takers in the
intermediate market. The mix of intermediates supplied is simply that which equates
the prices from the two sources. We now investigate the effects of constraining this
choice, by requiring that output “originate” in a country before it is exported. The19
products to which these instruments will or will not be applied. Most economic
analyses of ROOs has correspondingly taken place in frameworks involving a range of
policies in which it is easy for the effects of the ROO to become obscured.
Our objective in this paper has been to examine the potential commercial policy effects
of the ROO itself. Its distinguishing feature as a policy instrument is its ability to target
the input composition of inputs, and we demonstrated circumstances under which its
use could lead to an improvement in the importing country’s terms of trade. In a
competitive market this came about through the final goods exporters’ inability to take
account of the difference between average and marginal costs in purchasing their
inputs. In a monopolised market, the exporter minimises total (and average) costs, but
a ROO may reduce marginal costs. We also demonstrated that while their potential
benefits occur through terms of trade effects, ROOs are complementary to rather than
substitutes for tariffs on final outputs. When used in combination discriminatory tariffs
can focus on differences in the elasticity of supply of value added while ROOs are
targeted at the composition of intermediate inputs.
Finally, it is important to recall the qualifications that were made in the introduction.
Our aim here has been to deepen our understanding of the role of ROOs in economic
models and analysis, not to suggest new and wider applications for them in practice.
Although the potential distortions created by ROOs have been recognised, they
warrant greater analysis. Only when they are better understood can they be better
regulated.20
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